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I: Introduction
In spite of the significant number of disputes brought before
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization
f I would like to thank Prof. Christopher Parlin for his assistance in writing this article
and Jordan Cox for all his love and support.
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(WTO) since its inception in 1995,' there has been a paucity of
jurisprudence on one particular agreement under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 2 umbrella of agreements,
specifically the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
This trend ended very recently when four disputes involving
claims under the TBT were all decided in a relatively short two-
year period.' This sudden flood of decisions relating to the TBT
has greatly expanded the scope of jurisprudence on this agreement
and yielded some interesting results, particularly with respect to
the interpretation of TBT Article 2.1 and the chapeau to GATT
I From 1995-2013, there have been 474 disputes initiated by a request for
consultations. Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2013-A
Statistical Analysis, 17 J. INT'L ECON. LAW 191, 192 (2014).
2 GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, TIAS 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947], incorporated into General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867
U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
3 See Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon, Regulating Tobacco Flavors: Implications
of WTO Law, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 383, 416 (2011); Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IA, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 121 (1999), 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT]. From 1995 to
the beginning of 2014, there were forty-nine disputes initiated by a request for
consultations under the TBT Agreement. Leitner & Lester, supra note 1, at 196.
4 These cases are: United States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of
Clove Cigarettes [hereinafter U.S.-Clove Cigarettes]; United States-Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products [hereinafter
U.S.-Tuna II]; United States-Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements
[hereinafter U.S.-COOL]; and European Communities-Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products [hereinafter EC-Seal Products]. In all four
cases, the panel decision was appealed to the Appellate Body. The reports of the
Appellate Body in the first three cases were all released within a remarkably short period
of three months in 2012. See Appellate Body Report, US.-Clove Cigarettes,
WTIDS406/ABIR (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter: Appellate Body Report, US.-Clove
Cigarettes]; Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Tuna II, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012)
[hereinafter: Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Tuna 11]; Appellate Body Report, U.S.-
COOL, WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (June 29, 2012) [hereinafter: Appellate
Body Report, U.S.-COOL]. The decision of the panel in EC-Seal Products was released
in November 2013, and the Appellate Body Report was released in May 2014. Panel
Report, EC-Seal Products, WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R (Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter:
Panel Report, EC-Seal Products]; Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products,
WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter: Appellate Body
Report, EC-Seal Products].
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Article XX.5
The three recently issued Appellate Body decisions in U.S.-
Clove Cigarettes, U.S.-Tuna II, and U.S.-COOL are notable for
their uniform approach to interpreting TBT Article 2.1 by
incorporating the sixth recital of the preamble to the TBT as
context, and using jurisprudence from the chapeau to GATT
Article XX to inform this analysis. The panel report in EC-Seal
Products takes this approach to generate its logical conclusion by
replicating the analysis under TBT Article 2.1 under the chapeau
of GATT Article XX, thereby taking a uniform approach to
regulatory measures and the national treatment obligation under
both agreements, the TBT and the GATT. This result was
presciently anticipated by scholar Hajin Kim,' but it is not clear
that the EC-Seal Products panel's approach is the best way to
interpret the chapeau of GATT Article XX or that it is consistent
with prior WTO jurisprudence on the chapeau.' In fact, when the
panel decision was appealed, the Appellate Body completely
rejected the panel's parallel interpretation of the national treatment
obligations in the GATT and the TBT, and its transposition of
analysis under TBT Article 2.1 to the chapeau.9 In doing so, the
Appellate Body further clarified the legal standards applicable to
the national treatment obligations of the GATT and the TBT.o
This paper is primarily concerned with the principle of non-
discrimination as it applies to the national treatment obligation."
5 See U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4; U.S.-Tuna II, supra note 4; U.S.
COOL; EC-Seal Products, supra note 4.
6 See Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.644-.650.
7 Hajin Kim, Do Trade Liberalization and International Trade Law Constrain
Domestic Environmental Regulation?, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,823,
10,840 (2013).
8 See Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4; WTO Rules and
Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/envir e/envt rules exceptions e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
9 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $T 5.117-5.125,
5.31 1-.312.
1o Id.
II A regulatory measure may also discriminate in a manner that violates the most-
favored nation obligation. For example, the differential treatment in terms of negotiation
between the United States and several South American countries in comparison with
certain Asian countries gave rise to a most favored nation violation in the U.S.-Shrimp
dispute. However, it is more likely that a superficially origin-neutral regulatory measure
motivated by satisfying a domestic constituency will violate the national treatment
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National treatment as a general principle "imposes an obligation of
like treatment and non-discrimination between domestic and
foreign goods."l 2 National treatment is implicated not just by
tariffs, but also by non-tariff trade barriers that are facially non-
discriminatory but function so as to impede trade. " The aim of
national treatment obligations is "'to prevent domestic tax and
regulatory policies from being used as protectionist measures that
would defeat the purpose of tariff bindings'l 4 and to provide 'equal
conditions of competition once goods had been cleared through
customs.""' As a result, the national treatment obligations in the
GATT Agreements have the potential to encroach on Member
states' right to pursue domestic regulatory objectives.16
Trade liberalization is often perceived to be at odds with
domestic regulatory interests, particularly in the area of
environmental protections." Cases such as U.S.-Tuna I, U.S.-
Gasoline, and U.S.-Shrimp, where environmental regulations were
obligation by providing more favorable treatment to the domestic constituency's
products than like imported products. Therefore, this paper will focus on non-
discrimination as it applies under the national treatment obligation in the context of
regulatory measures.
12 MITSUO MATSUSHITA, ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 234 (2d ed. 2006); see also Simon Lester, The Role of the
International Trade Regime in Global Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
209, 223 (2011).
13 Danielle Spiegel Feld, Ensuring that Imported Biofuels Abide by Domestic
Environmental Standards: Will the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Tolerate
Asymmetrical Compliance Regimes?, 29 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 79, 93 (2011); see also
Norbert L. W. Wilson, Clarifying the Alphabet Soup of the TBT and the SPS in the WTO,
8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 703, 704 (2003).
14 GAETAN VERHOOSEL, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
ADJUDICATING THE BOUNDARIES OF REGULATORY AUTONOMY 12 (2002) (quoting JOHN
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 213 (1997)).
1s See id. at 12 (quoting Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against
Imported Agricultural Machinery, 11, L/833-7S/60 (Oct. 23, 1958)); see MATSUSHITA,
supra note 12, at 234; see Lester, supra note 12, at 214-15.
16 Feld, supra note 13, at 97.
17 Kim, supra note 7, at 10,823. However, studies suggest concerns about a "race
to the bottom" of regulatory standards due to trade liberalization are overblown and, in
fact, the GATT Agreements are more likely to incentivize excessive, non-discriminatory
regulation. See Robert W. Staiger & Alan 0. Sykes, Int'l Trade, Nat'l Treatment, &
Domestic Regulation, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 155 (2011) (.'[L]arge' nations may have
an incentive to impose discriminatory product standards against imported goods once
border instruments are constrained and ... inefficiently stringent standards may
emerge..
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struck down as unfairly applied, ignited a debate that cast the
WTO as anti-environment and hostile to domestic environmental
regulations." However, a more nuanced view of the interaction
between the WTO agreements and domestic regulatory measures
demonstrates that non-discriminatory standards can withstand
scrutiny and, as stronger standards emerge, ensure added
environmental benefits." The difficulty arises when exclusions or
carve-outs are included in otherwise facially non-discriminatory
regulatory measures to satisfy a domestic constituency. For
example, the regulatory measures in U.S.-Clove Cigarettes and
EC-Seal Products both included exceptions, the former for
menthol cigarettes predominantly manufactured in the United
States,2 0 and the latter for seal products resulting from Inuit hunts
and marine resource management programs conducted in EU
countries.2 1 A regulation that combines a prohibition on foreign or
imported products with a carve-out for a domestic constituency is
most likely to result in a finding of inconsistency with national
treatment obligations due to unfair or uneven application of the
regulation.2 2
Section II of this paper discusses national treatment obligations
under both the GATT and the TBT. Section III discusses the EC-
Seal Products case, comparing the more textual approach of the
panel with the Appellate Body's strongly contextual approach to
interpretation of the texts. Section IV analyzes the implications of
the Appellate Body decision, including the implications that (1)
the different standards applicable to the national treatment
obligations in the GATT and the TBT potentially render the latter
a nullity, and (2) satisfying the test for justifying a discriminatory
regulation under the chapeau of GATT Article XX is nearly
impossible. 23 Additionally, the Appellate Body maintains its firm
refusal to consider evidence of regulatory intent.24 However,
18 Kim, supra note 7, at 10,824, 10,832.
19 Id.
20 Mitchell & Voon, supra note 3, at 387-88; Tania Voon, Flexibilities in WTO
Law to Support Tobacco Control Regulation, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 199, 202-03 (2013).
21 See Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.1.
22 Id.
23 See infra Sec. V; see also Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note
4, if 5.316-.339.
24 See generally Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4
(demonstrating the Appellate Body's refusal to consider Canada's evidence of regulatory
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because addressing intentional discrimination is part of the object
and purpose of the GATT, discriminatory intent could, and should
be addressed under the sub-paragraphs of GATT Article XX.25
Section V discusses implications for regulators of the EC-Seal
Products decision, which builds on the other recently decided TBT
disputes. The obvious takeaway is that the likelihood that a
regulatory measure will be found inconsistent with WTO
obligations increases dramatically if the measure includes carve-
outs for domestic constituencies.2 6 Nevertheless, the political
reality of domestic regulation and factors reducing the significance
of an adverse WTO ruling suggest that Members will continue to
include carve-outs in regulatory measures as necessary to satisfy
domestic constituents.
II: National Treatment Under the GATT Agreements
Regulatory measures can be challenged as inconsistent with
the principle of national treatment under two agreements-Article
III:4 of the GATT 1994 and the analogous provision of the TBT,
Article 2. 1.27 The GATT and the TBT apply in parallel, making it
possible for the same measure to be challenged under both
agreements simultaneously.2 8 GATT Article III:4 applies to all
internal laws, regulations, and requirements other than internal
taxation measures. 29 The TBT has a narrower scope, applying
specifically to technical regulations and standards.30 "Technical
regulation" is defined in Annex 1:1 of the TBT as any "document
which lays down product characteristics, or their related processes
and production methods . . . . with which compliance is
mandatory."" Technical regulations are distinguished from
standards, in that compliance with the former is mandatory, while
compliance with the latter is optional.32
The touchstone for interpretation of the WTO Agreements is
intent).
25 See GATT 1994, supra note 2.
26 See infra SEc. V: IMPuCATiON FOR REGULATORS
27 TREBILCOCK, ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 309 (2013).
28 Id.
29 GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. III:4; TREBILCOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 138.
30 TREBILCOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 309.
31 TBT, supra note 3, Annex 1:1.
32 TREBILCOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 309.
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Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which
provides that the WTO agreements, including the GATT and the
TBT, are to be interpreted "in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law." 3 The Appellate Body
has interpreted the reference to public international law in Article
3.2 to incorporate the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT), which provides in Article 31 that "treat[ies] shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
[o]f the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object
and purpose."" Supplementary tools of interpretation-such as
subsequent agreements or evidence of the drafters' intentas-may
be used only to confirm the meaning derived from an Article 31
analysis, or to clarify when the Article 31 analysis yields an
ambiguous or manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. While a
panel or the Appellate Body may consider other WTO agreements
in considering the ordinary meaning of the text under VCLT
Article 31,3 they generally decline to consider the negotiating
33 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Import Prohibitions of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp].
35 James T. Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 29 1,
299 (2002).
36 VCLT Article 31(2) states that the "context" to Article 31(1) includes the text, its
preamble and annexes, any agreement relating to the treaty made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, and any instrument made by one or more
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties
as an instrument related to the treaty. Article 31(3) provides that additional context may
come from any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions, any subsequent practice in application of
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, and
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
VCLT, supra note 34, art. 31(2), (3); see also Divya Murthy, Comment, The Future of
Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1299, 1317-18 (2002).
37 See Appellate Body Report, US.-Shrimp, supra note 34, 129-30 (looking to
other "modern international conventions and declarations" outside the GATT in
performing an Article 31 ordinary meaning analysis of the term "exhaustible natural
resources").
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history of the texts.
Accordingly, under DSU Article 3.2, an interpretation of
GATT Article 111:4 and TBT Article 2.1 should focus on the text
of the two provisions, in context and in light of each agreement's
object and purpose. The text of the two provisions is roughly
identical. Article III:4 of the GATT requires that Members ensure
that their internal regulations do not discriminate against foreign
goods,39 stating as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.40
Panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted GATT Article
111:4 as laying down a three-prong test: first, whether the products
are like products; second, whether the measure is an internal law,
regulation, or requirement; and third, whether the imported
products are accorded less favorable treatment than like domestic
products.4 1
TBT Article 2.1 sets forth a similar national treatment
obligation that applies only to technical regulations. Article 2.1
states that "[m]embers shall ensure that in respect of technical
regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin and to like products originating
in any other country." 42  Panels and the Appellate Body have
interpreted TBT Article 2.1 by reference to GATT Article III:4,
applying the same three-prong test laid out above, 43 because of the
38 See Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, 1 45, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report, India-Products].
39 Feld, supra note 13, at 91.
40 GATT, supra note 2, art. 111:4; TREBILCOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 154.
41 Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/ABIR, WT/DS169/AB/R, 1 133 (Dec. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Korea-Bee/J.
42 TBT, supra note 3, art. 2.1.
43 See Panel Report, U.S.-COOL, WT/DS384/R, WT/DS386/R, 1 7.234 (Nov. 18,
2011) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.-COOL]; Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Clove
Cigarettes, supra note 4, % 99-100.
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similarity in language of the two provisions.4 4
The text of each provision must also be read in light of its
context. GATT Article III must be read in conjunction with
GATT Article XX, which provides a list of exceptions that allow
WTO Members to introduce or maintain measures that are
inconsistent with the substantive obligations of the GATT.45 The
GATT Article XX exceptions serve the important function of
allowing Members to participate in the WTO system while
preserving certain aspects of national sovereignty over domestic
policy issues.46 There is a three-part analysis under GATT Article
XX whereby a measure found provisionally inconsistent with an
obligation under the GATT must: first, be within the scope of one
of the policy interests protected by the subparagraphs of Article
XX; second, satisfy the relational clause of that subparagraph; and
third, meet the requirements of the chapeau. 47 The policy interests
protected in the subparagraphs of Article XX include the
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health.4 ' The chapeau
of GATT Article XX was included to prevent the general
exceptions of Article XX from being abused by a lack of good
faith, 49 and requires that a measure, provisionally justified under
44 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4, NJ 99-100 ("We
note that the language of the national treatment obligation of Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement closely resembles the language of Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994... The
national treatment obligations of Article 2.1 and Article 111:4 are built around the same
core terms, namely, "like products" and "treatment no less favorable . . . The very similar
formulation of the provisions, and the overlap in their scope of application in terms of
technical regulations, confirm that Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 is relevant context for
the interpretation of the national treatment obligation of Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement."). See generally Simon Lester, Finding the Boundaries of International
Economic Law, 17 J. INT'L EcON. L. 3 (2014) (discussing the negotiating history of TBT
Article 2.1).
45 See STEFAN ZLEPTNIG, NON-EcoNOMIC OBJECTIVES IN WTO LAW: JUSTIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF GATT, GATS, SPS AND TBT AGREEMENTS 105, (2010).
46 Id. at 90-92; CHRISTIANE R. CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS
(PPMS) IN WTO LAW: INTERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOALS 247, (2011) ("Article XX
recognizes that the ability of any sovereign nation to act and promote the listed policy
purposes is more important, even if such action is in conflict with various GATT
obligations.").
47 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 22 (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, U.S.-Gasoline].
48 See GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. XX(b).
49 ZLEPTNIG, supra note 45, at 116.
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one of the subparagraphs of Article XX, not constitute arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or operate as a disguised restriction on
trade.so
The TBT has no analogous provision to GATT Article XX
providing for exceptions, and the GATT Article XX exceptions
have never been interpreted as applicable to the TBT.5 However,
there are two provisions of the TBT that, when combined with
TBT Article 2.1, resemble GATT Article XX: TBT Article 2.2 and
the sixth recital of the TBT preamble.52 In addition to the basic
national treatment obligation in TBT Article 2.1, TBT Article 2.2
requires that technical regulations not be applied so as to create
unnecessary obligations to international trade and to not be more
trade-restrictive than necessary.s3 This requirement is similar in
content to the exceptions to the GATT in Article XX.5 However,
unlike the exceptions in GATT Article XX, TBT Article 2.2
imposes an affirmative obligation of least-trade-restrictiveness, as
opposed to permitting an exception to an obligation, so long as it is
not more trade-restrictive than necessary." TBT Article 2.2
cannot be invoked as a defense to a violation of the TBT.5 6
The more important TBT provision, which informs TBT
Article 2.1 and draws parallels between the interpretation of TBT
Article 2.1 and of GATT Articles III:4 and XX, is the sixth recital
of the preamble to the TBT.5" The trilogy of recent Appellate
50 GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. XX; ZLEPTNIG, supra note 45, at 274.
51 See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOuc, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 548-52 (2013). In U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, the United
States decided to not even raise the possibility of using Article XX to defend its ban on
clove cigarettes from attack under Article 2 of the TBT Agreement. See Panel Report,
US.-Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, } 7.296 (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report,
US.-Clove Cigarettes]. But see ERICH VRANES, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, WTO LAW, AND LEGAL THEORY 304,
(2009) ("[I]t could be argued that, all WTO provisions being cumulative in principle,
Article XX of the GATT should also be regarded as applicable in respect of the TBT
Agreement.").
52 See TBT, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 2:1, 2.2
53 Id. art. 2.2.
54 See GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. XX; see also TBT, supra note 3, art. 2.2.
55 TREBILCOCK, FT AL., supra note 27, at 312.
56 AUTAR KRISiEN Kout, GUIDI; To Till WTO AND GATT: ECONOMIICs, LAw AND
POLITICs 435, (2005).
57 See TBT, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 2:1; see also GATT 1994. supra note 2. art.
111:4, XX.
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Body decisions involving the TBT, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, U.S.-
Tuna II, and U.S.-COOL, significantly added to our understanding
of the appropriate interpretation of TBT Article 2.1 by
incorporating the sixth recital of the TBT preamble as context in
interpreting Article 2.1." The sixth recital of the TBT preamble
provides that countries may take measures necessary for the
protection of animal or human life or health so long as the
measures do not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade. 9 The sixth recital is very
similar in content to the affirmative defense under GATT Article
XX(b) and the chapeau of Article XX.o While the sixth recital
does not technically operate as an affirmative defense, but rather is
considered as context for the "treatment no less favorable"
requirement in TBT Article 2.1,61 the Appellate Body has applied
it as a burden-shifting device analogous to an affirmative
defense.62 The combined effect of TBT Article 2.1 and the sixth
recital of the preamble to the TBT balances between avoiding
unnecessary trade restrictions and recognizing Members' right to
regulate, and mirrors the balance between the general obligations
under the GATT and the general exceptions in GATT Article
The Appellate Body first incorporated the sixth recital to the
TBT as context for interpreting Article 2.1 in U.S.-Clove
Cigarettes, where the Appellate Body held that the sixth recital
suggests Members have a right to use technical regulations in
pursuit of legitimate objectives, provided they do so in an even-
58 See Appellate Body Report, US.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4; Appellate
Body Report, U.S.-Tuna II, supra note 4; Appellate Body Report, U.S.-COOL, supra
note 4; see also TBT, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 2.1.
59 TBT, supra note 3, pmbl.
6o See GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. XX(b) (providing that nothing in the GATT
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; chapeau providing that GATT
Art. XX(b) is subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade).
61 See Kim, supra note 7, at 10,835; Appellate Body Report, US.-Tuna II, supra
note 4, 213.
62 See Kim, supra note 7, at 10,834-35.
63 Id. at 10,835; see also Mary Hess Eliason, Regulatory Marketing Approval for
Pharmaceuticals as a Non- TariffBarrier to Trade: Analysis under the WTO's Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 559, 575 (2007).
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handed manner that does not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.6 If a measure is not de jure discriminatory, the
particular circumstances of the case (namely the design,
architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application of the
technical regulation)5 must be scrutinized to determine if the
regulation is even-handed in order to determine whether the
detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction. The Appellate Body determined that the
U.S. measure banning imported clove cigarettes, but permitting
domestically-produced menthol cigarettes, had a detrimental
impact on competitive opportunities for clove cigarettes from
Indonesia and therefore discriminated against the group of like-
imported cigarettes.6 ' Furthermore, this discrimination did not
stem from a legitimate regulatory distinction because the same
concern over youth-smoking applied to both clove and menthol
cigarettes. Consequently, the Appellate Body concluded that the
measure accorded imported cigarettes less favorable treatment
than domestic cigarettes, thereby violating TBT Article 2. 1.69
In U.S.-Tuna II, the Appellate Body reiterated that the sixth
recital "sheds light on the meaning . .. of the 'treatment no less
favorable' requirement in Article 2.1, by making clear, in
particular, that technical regulations may pursue legitimate
objectives but must not be applied in a manner that would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."70
The analysis under TBT Article 2.1 of "treatment no less
favorable" therefore incorporates language from the sixth recital of
the preamble and requires more than just a showing of less
favorable treatment or detrimental effect.7  If a complainant
makes a prima facie case that a technical regulation treats imported
goods less favorably, for example, by showing that the measure is
not even-handed in application and thus inconsistent with TBT
Article 2.1, then the respondent has an opportunity to show that.
64 Appellate Body Report, US.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4, IT 95, 173.
65 Id. 1l82.
66 Id.1216.
67 Id. $$ 221-24.
68 Id.1225.
69 Id.1226.
70 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Tuna II, supra note 4, 1213.
71 Id. TI 214-15.
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the detrimental impact "stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction" and is not arbitrary or unjustifiable.7 2 The
Appellate Body held that Mexico established a prima facie case
that the U.S. "dolphin-safe" labeling requirement had a detrimental
impact on circumstances of competition for Mexican tuna
disproportionately caught using a prohibited fishing method.
The United States failed to rebut this case by showing that the
detrimental impact on Mexican tuna stemmed exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction because the measure was not
even-handed in addressing the risks to dolphins posed by other,
non-prohibited fishing methods.74
In its most recent decision to address the TBT, the Appellate
Body in U.S.-COOL followed the relevant guidance from US.-
Clove Cigarettes and U S.-Tuna II in interpreting TBT Article 2.1,
specifically the term "treatment no less favorable."" The
Appellate Body reiterated that a measure with a detrimental impact
on imported products "may not be inconsistent with [TBT] Article
2.1 when such impact stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction."" A regulatory distinction is not legitimate
where it is "not designed and applied in an even-handed manner
because, for example, it is designed or applied in a manner that
constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination. . . ."" The Appellate Body held that the U.S.
country of origin labeling requirements had a detrimental impact
on imported livestock because it incentivized U.S. producers to
process exclusively U.S.-origin livestock." Additionally, the
detrimental impact was not based on a legitimate regulatory
distinction." The measure necessitated segregating imported
livestock; there was also a disconnect between the detailed
recordkeeping and verification requirements on producers
mandated by the measure, and the minimal information provided
72 Id. T 216.
73 Id. 284.
74 Id. 11 292, 297-98.
75 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-COOL, supra note 4, 269.
76 Id.1270.
77 Id.
78 Id. % 289, 292.
79 Id. 330.
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to consumers on origin-the ostensible purpose of the measure.so
The measure was not applied in an even-handed manner, and thus
violated TBT Article 2.1, because "the regulatory distinctions
imposed by the COOL measure amount[ed] to arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination against imported livestock. . . ."81
The GATT and the TBT offer distinct approaches to
determining that a regulation is discriminatory, and therefore
inconsistent with a substantive obligation, while permitting the
respondent to justify the discriminatory aspects of a regulation as
legitimate and not arbitrary or unjustifiable.8 2 The TBT is
generally interpreted as imposing stricter obligations, albeit with a
narrower scope of application, namely only covering technical
regulations, because it does not have an analogous set of
exceptions as in GATT Article XX." Nevertheless, one
commentator argues that the Appellate Body's application of the
"arbitrary or unjustifiable" standard in GATT Article XX chapeau,
effectively requiring an affirmative showing of positive conduct
taken to ameliorate discriminatory effect, has prevented successful
utilization of the Article XX affirmative defenses. 84 in contrast,
the TBT jurisprudence more easily justifies regulations because of
the reduced burden on respondents of merely demonstrating
"even-handedness" or a lack of discriminatory intent." This
relative weighing of the burdens imposed by the nondiscrimination
obligations in the GATT and the TBT, gleaned from the three prior
TBT decisions discussed above, was tested and confirmed in EC-
80 Id. 1 347-49.
81 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-COOL, supra note 4, T 349.
82 Benn McGrady & Alexandra Jones, Tobacco Control and Beyond: The Broader
Implications of United States-Clove Cigarettesfor Non-Communicable Diseases, 39 AM.
J.L. & MED. 265, 272 (2013) (arguing that the GATT might be more permissive than the
TBT when there are discrepancies in determining discriminatory regulation).
83 Feld, supra note 13, at 82 (stating that the TBT Agreement has "no obvious
analogue to Article XX"); see also Mitchell & Voon, supra note 3, at 417 (arguing that
because TBT obligations are different from those under the GATT, "'like products'
should... be interpreted more narrowly under the TBT Agreement in order to avoid
unwarranted interference with legitimate regulatory policies").
84 Kim, supra note 7, at 10,836-38 (arguing that despite the chapeau's purpose to
ensure that Article XX defenses are exercised in good faith, application of the chapeau
has invalidated environmental measures in cases where there is no showing of bad faith
or illegitimate intent but a Member failed to take affirmative action to counteract
discriminatory effect).
85 Id. at 10,836.
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Seal Products."
III: EC-Seal Products
A. Background of the Dispute
Canada and Norway brought a dispute against the European
Union (EU) at the WTO alleging that an EU regulatory regime
prohibiting the importation and sale of seal products violated the
EU's WTO obligations." The regulatory regime, termed the EU
Seal Regime, was composed of two primary regulations, a Basic
Regulation8 ' and an Implementing Regulation," and prohibited the
importation or sale of seal products in the EU" unless certain
conditions were met.9' The conditions provided two primary
exceptions: an exception for "seal products obtained from seals
hunted by Inuit or indigenous communities" (IC exception) and an
exception for "seal products obtained from seals hunted for marine
resource management" (MRM exception). 92 These exceptions to
the basic ban on the sale of seal products were provided for in
Articles 3:1 and 3:2(b) of the Basic Regulation, respectively.93
86 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 5.214, .336.
87 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $ 7.1.
88 Id. $ 2.2 (noting that the Basic Regulation was "Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009
of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products, adopted
September 16, 2009").
89 Id. 2.4 (noting that the Implementing Regulation was "Commission Regulation
(EU) No. 737/2010, [establishing] detailed rules for the implementation of [Regulation
(EC) No. 1007/2009], adopted August 10, 2010").
90 Id. $ 7.105 (prohibiting "all seal products, whether they are made exclusively of
seal or contain seal as an input").
91 Id. $ 7.1, .45 ("[Tihe practical implication of [the measure] is that seal products
derived from hunts other than IC or MRM hunts cannot be imported and/or placed on the
EU market.").
92 Id. 7.1.
93 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $ 7.12. Article 3:1 "conditions
for placing on the market, provided that "[t]he placing on the market of seal products
shall be allowed only where the seal products result from hunts traditionally conducted
by Inuit and other indigenous communities and contribute to their subsistence." Id.
Article 3:2(b) provided that derogation from Article 3:1 was permitted where "the seal
products result from by-products of hunting that is regulated by national law and
conducted for the sole purpose of the sustainable management of marine resources." Id.
The MRM exception was further limited to sales on a nonprofit basis. Id. The
Implementing Regulation further clarified that for seal products to fall under the IC
exception, the seal products must originate from seal hunts that satisfy the following
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Canada and Norway challenged the EU Seal Regime as
inconsistent with Articles 1:1, 111:4, XI:l, and XXIII:1(b) of the
GATT 1994; Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.1.2, and 5.2.1 of the TBT; and
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.94
B. The Panel Decision
The Panel found that the EU Seal Regime violated TBT Article
2.1 and GATT Articles 1:1 and III:4,95 and thus could not be
justified under GATT Article XX(a) or (b).96
1. TBT Annex 1: JTechnical Regulation
The panel first considered "the complainants' claims under the
TBT Agreement"; as a preliminary matter, the panel had to
"determine whether the EU Seal Regime constitute[d] a 'technical
regulation' within the meaning of Annex 1:1 of the TBT
Agreement and thus [fell] within the scope of the Agreement."
The Appellate Body has developed a three-part test to establish
whether a document qualifies as a technical regulation: (1) "the
document must apply to an identifiable product or group of
products," (2) "the document must lay down one or more
characteristics of the product," and (3) "compliance with the
product characteristics must be mandatory."98 The parties agreed
that the measure satisfied the first and third requirements,99 and the
conditions: the hunts must be "conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities with
a tradition of seal hunting in the community and in the geographical region"; the
products from the hunts must be "partly used, consumed[,] or processed within the
communities according to its traditions"; and the hunts must "contribute to the
subsistence of the community." Commission Regulation 737/2010, art. 3, 2010 O.J. (L
216) 1, 2 (EU). The Implementing Regulation also provided that to fall within the MRM
exception, seal products must originate from seal hunts that satisfy the following
conditions: the hunts must be "conducted under a national or regional natural resources
management plan which uses scientific population models ... and applies the ecosystem-
based approach"; the hunts must "not exceed the total allowable catch quota established"
according to the aforementioned management plan; and the by-products of the hunts
must be "placed on the market in a nonsystematic way on a nonprofit basis." Id. art. 5.
94 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $ 3.1, .4.
95 Id. 7.353, .505, .600, .609.
96 Id. 7.640, .651.
97 Id.$7.83.
98 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines,
176, WT/DS23I/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002).
99 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $ 7.86.
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panel concurred.'oo The only issue in dispute was whether the
measure, which consisted of a prohibition and certain exceptions,
sufficiently laid down product characteristics.o' The panel first
noted that "for a measure consisting of a ban and certain
exceptions to qualify as a technical regulation," it was not
necessary that "both the prohibition and the exceptions ...
individually lay down product characteristics."'0 2 The panel then
concluded that the second requirement of the test was met because
"the EU Seal Regime . .. as a whole [laid] down characteristics for
all products" containing seal and "[laid] down the applicable
administrative provisions for certain products ... that [were]
exempted" from the measure's prohibition on seal products.0 3
Consequently, the measure was a technical regulation that fell
within the scope of Annex 1:1 of the TBT Agreement.104
2. TBTArticle 2.1
The panel then considered whether the EU Seal Regime was
inconsistent with TBT Article 2.1.'os Having found that the
measure was a technical regulation, the panel followed the
approach to TBT Article 2.1 laid out by the Appellate Body in
US.-Clove Cigarettes,'0 6 asking first whether "the imported and
domestic .. . products at issue" were alike, and second whether
"the treatment accorded the imported products [was] less
favourable than that accorded to like domestic . .. products."'
The panel concluded that the imported and domestic products were
like products because the only distinction between seal products
that conform to the EU Seal Regime and those that do not conform
is the type or purpose of the seal hunt from which the products





105 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.126-.129.
1o6 Id. 7.129, n.173. In U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body stated that it
was appropriate to look to GATT Article III:4 as context in interpreting TBT Article 2,1.
Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4, 120.
107 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.129; Appellate Body Report,
U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4, $ 87 (completing the same analysis only after
determining whether a measure at issue is a "technical regulation").
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were derived,' which does not affect any of the four criteria
relevant to whether products are "like" under GATT Article
111:4.09
The panel then went on to consider whether there was less
favorable treatment, asking whether the EU Seal Regime causes a
detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imported
products and whether any detrimental impact on imports can be
explained by a legitimate regulatory distinction."o Whether a
measure has a detrimental impact on competition depends on "the
design, structure, and expected operation of the measure," as well
as any relevant market features."' The panel found that the IC
exception was designed so that all or virtually all seal products
from Greenland would be able to access the EU market" 2 and that
the MRM exception was designed to allow all or virtually all seal
products from Sweden only to access the EU market."' The fact
that a small number of Canada's seal products "could enter the EU
market [did] not change the fact that the vast majority of Canada's
seal products [were] in fact excluded" from the market as
nonconforming." 4 Therefore, the panel concluded that the EU
Seal Regime had "a detrimental impact on the competitive
opportunities" of imported seal products."'
Having found that there was a detrimental impact, the panel
finished its analysis under TBT Article 2.1 by asking whether that
detrimental impact stemmed "exclusively from legitimate
108 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1$ 7.138-.139.
109 Id. 7.139-.140. The four criteria relevant under GATT Article 111:4 are: (a)
the properties of the products, (b) "the end-uses of the products," (c) "consumers' tastes
and habits," and (d) "the tariff classification of the products." Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, 1 101, WT/DSl35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
110 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1$ 7.130-.132.
iii Id. 11 7.156-.157 (explaining how relevant features could include "particular
characteristics of the industry at issue, the relative market shares in a given industry,
consumer preferences, as well as historical trade patterns"); Appellate Body Report,
U.S.-COOL, supra note 4, T 269. A determination that a measure has a detrimental
impact on competitive opportunities for imported products does not have to be "based on
the actual effects of the contested measure in the market place." Panel Report, EC-Seal
Products, supra note 4, $ 7.156.
112 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 17.164.
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regulatory distinctions... .""6 The regulatory distinctions made
in the EU Seal Regime were between conforming and
nonconforming products, namely products that fall within the IC
and MRM exceptions and those that do not.' In analyzing
whether the distinctions between seal hunting under the IC and
MRM exceptions and commercial hunting were legitimate, the
panel followed the example of the Appellate Body in U.S.-Clove
Cigarettes and looked to Appellate Body guidance in previous
disputes concerning obligations under the chapeau of GATT
Article XX."' The chapeau to GATT Article XX provides that a
measure must not be "applied in a manner [that] would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail... ."I19 Meeting this
standard is necessary in order for a measure that has been found to
be discriminatory, and therefore inconsistent with one of the
substantive obligations of the GATT, to fall within an exception
under Article XX.'2 0 Under the chapeau to Article XX,
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable where "the cause or
rationale of the discrimination does not rationally relate to the
objective of the measure.' 2 '
The panel combined the guidance of the Appellate Body under
TBT Article 2.1 and the chapeau to GATT Article XX to craft a
three-part test for "the legitimacy of a regulatory distinction,"
asking first, whether the regulatory distinction between
commercial and noncommercial (i.e. IC and MRM) seal hunts was
rationally related "to the objective of the EU Seal Regime," 22 in
order "to address the moral concerns of the EU public with regard
to the welfare of seals"; 23 second, if not, whether there exists "any
116 Id. 7.172.
117 Id. 7.176. These distinctions were based on several criteria: "[T]he identity of
the hunter; the type of hunt; the purpose of the hunt; and the way ... the products [were]
marketed." Id.
118 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.258.
119 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX.
120 See id.
121 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
225-27, WT/DS332/ABIR (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Brazil-
Tyres].
122 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.259.
123 Id. $ 7.274.
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cause or rationale that can justify the distinction"; 12 4 and third,
whether the distinction is "designed or applied in a manner that
constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination such that it
lacks even-handedness."' 2 5 A regulatory distinction must pass
either the first or the second part of the test and the third part of the
test to be considered legitimate. 126
The panel applied its three-part test to the IC exception and
found that the regulatory distinction was not legitimate because it
failed the third requirement of being designed and applied in an
even-handed manner.'27 Although the IC exception failed the first
part of the test, because the same animal welfare concerns arising
from commercial seal hunts also exist in IC hunts,'2 8 the second
part of the test was satisfied because the purpose of the IC hunts,
for the subsistence and culture of Inuit communities, was different
from the purpose of commercial hunts.12 9 Nevertheless, the panel
concluded that the IC hunts failed the third part of the test because
the IC exception was crafted to apply exclusively to Inuit hunts in
Greenland, and therefore "was not designed or applied in an even-
handed manner ... 30
The panel then applied the three-part test to the MRM
exception and concluded that it failed all three parts."' The MRM
exception failed the first part of the test because the same animal
welfare concerns arising from commercial seal hunts also exist in
MRM hunts, and therefore the regulatory distinction between
commercial and noncommercial seal hunts does not bear a rational
relationship to the objective of the measure.132  The MRM
exception failed the second part of the test because the purpose of
the MRM hunts included a commercial aspect, and thus was no
different from the purpose of commercial hunts.' Finally, the
MRM exception failed the third part of the test because the MRM
124 Id.17.259.
125 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126 See id.
127 Id. ? 7.319.
128 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, T 7.275.
129 Id. TJ 7.289, .300.
130 Id. 7.317.
131 Id. 11 7.337-.340.
132 Id.
133 Id. 1 7.343, .346.
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exception was designed to apply to seal products from certain EU
member states, namely Sweden, Finland, and possibly the United
Kingdom, and therefore was not designed in an even-handed
manner.13 4 The panel therefore concluded that the IC and MRM
exceptions were inconsistent with TBT Article 2.1 because "the
detrimental impact caused by the IC exception" did not stem
"excluisively from a legitimate [regulatory] distinction.""'
Instead of asserting a violation of TBT Article 2.1 as Canada
did, Norway alleged that the EU Seal Regime violated GATT
Article I:1 by restricting market access to a limited group of
countries, namely Greenland."' GATT Article I:1 imposes an
obligation of most-favored nation treatment."' A measure violates
GATT Article I:1 where it provides an advantage to products
originating in one Member country, but does not immediately
provide the same advantage to products originating in other
Member countries."' The panel found that because the EU Seal
Regime granted an advantage of access to the EU market for seal
products from Greenland,'39 and did not "immediately and
unconditionally" extend the same market access advantage to
Norway's imports, it thereby violated GATT Article 1:1 140
3. GATT Article III:4
Finally, the panel analyzed the EU Seal Regime under the
national treatment obligation of GATT Article 111:4.141 The panel
compared the analysis under TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Article
111:4, noting that the former permits a measure which has a
detrimental impact on imports if there is a legitimate regulatory
distinction, whereas the latter's "treatment no less favorable"
standard categorically prohibits WTO [M]embers from modifying
the conditions of competition.. .to the detriment of imports.142 The
stricter standard under GATT Article 111:4 reflects the availability
134 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $$ 7.350-352.
135 Id. 7.319, .353.
136 Id. 7.588-.590.
137 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. 1:1.
138 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.593.
139 Id. 7.597.
140 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. 1:1.
141 Id. 7.585.
142 Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 5.117.
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of the general exceptions clause in GATT Article XX, which can
be used to justify a measure found to be inconsistent with Article
III:4.14' There is a three-part test under GATT Article 111:4, which
asks first, whether the measure is a law, regulation, or requirement
"affecting [the] internal sale, offering for sale, purchase . .. or use"
of goods; second, whether the products at issue are "like;" and
third, whether the imported products are accorded less favorable
treatment than that accorded to like domestic products.144  The
panel found that the EU Seal Regime was a law or regulation and,
as previously discussed in the context of TBT Article 2.1, the
imported and domestic products at issue are "like" within the
meaning of GATT Article 111:4.145 Finally, the third element of the
test under Article III:4 was met because the EU Seal Regime
excludes virtually all Canadian and Norwegian seal products from
the EU market while excepting products from certain EU
countries, thereby according less favorable treatment to imported
products than the like domestic products.146 Consequently, the EU
Seal Regime was inconsistent with GATT Article III:4.147
4. GATT Article XX(a)
The EU attempted to justify its measure as falling within the
exception in GATT Article XX(a), for measures necessary to
protect public morals.'4 8 In order for a measure to fall within one
of the exceptions under GATT Article XX, a respondent must
demonstrate that three elements are met: first, the measure must
fall within the scope of the subparagraph invoked; second, the
relational clause of the subparagraph must be satisfied; and third,
the measure must meet the requirements of the chapeau. 149 The
panel found that the first element of the exceptions test was met
because the policy objective pursued by the EU in enacting the EU
143 Id.
144 Id. 7.605; see also Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef, supra note 41, 1 133
(noting the three elements required in order to avoid a violation of Article 111:4).
145 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.606-.607.
146 Id. 7.608.
147 Id. 1 7.609.
148 Id. 7.640. The EU also tried to justify the measure under GATT Article XX(b),
for measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, but the panel
found that the EU failed to make a prima facie case with respect to Article XX(b). Id.
149 Appellate Body Report, US.-Gasoline, supra note 47, at 22.
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Seal Regime, to address the public moral concerns on seal welfare,
fell within the scope of Article XX(a): to protect public morals.'
The panel also found that the second element, satisfaction of the
relational clause, was met because the measure contributed
sufficiently to the objective of addressing public moral concerns
on seal welfare and there were no reasonably available, less trade-
restrictive alternatives. '
5. GATT Article XX Chapeau
Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the measure could not
be justified under GATT Article XX because the requirements of
the chapeau were not met.152 The chapeau to GATT Article XX
requires that measures not be "applied in a manner [that] would
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail . . . .""' Here, the
panel recalled that the TBT and the GATT 1994 are to be read in
context, and referred to its prior analysis under TBT Article 2.1,
under which discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable where a
regulatory distinction is not rationally related to the objective of
the measure or not otherwise based on justifiable grounds, and
where a regulatory distinction is not applied in an even-handed
manner. 5 4  The panel then reiterated its findings that the
regulatory distinction in the IC exception is otherwise
justifiable,"' despite the lack of a rational connection to the
measure's objective, but nevertheless arbitrary and unjustifiable
because of a lack of even-handedness in application."'
Additionally, the MRM exception is arbitrary and unjustifiable
because it is not rationally related to "the objective of the EU Seal
Regime," nor otherwise justifiable, and "not designed [or] applied
in an even-handed manner."' Consequently, the EU Seal Regime
15o Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 7.631.
151 Id. f 7.638-.639.
152 Id. 7.643.
153 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX.
154 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $$ 7.649-.650.
'55 Id. $ 7.289. The IC exception is otherwise justifiable because the purpose of the
IC hunts, for the subsistence and culture of Inuit communities, was different from the
purpose of commercial hunts. Id. 7.300.
156 Id. $ 7.650.
157 Id
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does not meet the requirements of the chapeau and cannot be
justified under GATT Article XX.'"
C. The Appellate Body Decision
The Appellate Body decision in EC-Seal Products illustrates
the correct approach to a contextual analysis and highlights a
fundamental inconsistency in the panel's analysis.' One of the
pitfalls that plagues the panel report, and many Members'
approach to interpretation, is that the panel, when analyzing the
context of a term, looked for identical text in other articles or
agreements and then adopted the same interpretation broadcloth,
treating it as conclusive without considering differences in the two
textual provisions.o This approach is a fundamental
misapplication of contextualism, as can be demonstrated by
comparing the relationship between TBT Article 2.1 and GATT
Article 111:4 with the relationship between TBT Article 2.1 and the
chapeau to GATT Article XX. "'
The Appellate Body upheld the majority of the panel's
findings while squarely disagreeing with the panel's analysis,
particularly with regard to the chapeau to GATT Article XX. 16 2
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body did reverse the panel's findings
with respect to the TBT Agreement because there were insufficient
158 Id.17.651.
159 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, % 5.307-.339.
160 See id. 5.308; see also Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.258
(using the "similarities in their texts" to justify interpreting "whether discrimination is
'arbitrary or unjustifiable' under the chapeau" under the TBT Agreement through past
analysis of GATT 1994).
161 Compare TBT, supra note 3, art. 2.1 ("Members shall ensure that in respect of
technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin and to like products originating in any other country."), with GATT 1947, supra
note 2, art. 111:4 ("The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use."), and id. art. XX, chapeau ("Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . .
obligated under the General Agreement.).
162 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 6.1.
652 Vol. XL
2015 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EC-SEAL PRODUCTS DISPUTE
facts to determine whether the EU Seal Regime falls within its
scope.16' Article 2 of the TBT applies only to "technical
regulations," which are defined in Annex 1:1 of the TBT as
"[d]ocument[s] which lay[] down product characteristics or their
related processes and production methods . . . ."'" The Appellate
Body reversed the panel's finding that the EU Seal Regime
constitutes a technical regulation under TBT Annex 1:1,161 finding
that the panel improperly characterized the measure as laying
down product characteristics without fully examining its design
and operation.166 The Appellate Body then determined that neither
the prohibition on seal products nor the exceptions to the
prohibition under the EU Seal Regime prescribe or impose any
characteristics on seal products.' Having found that the EU Seal
Regime does not establish product characteristics, and therefore
cannot constitute a technical regulation on that basis, the Appellate
Body declined to complete the legal analysis of "whether the EU
Seal Regime lays down '. . . processes and production methods'
within the meaning of [TBT] Annex 1:1," because the issue was
not fully examined at the panel stage.'6 1 Consequently, the
Appellate Body concluded that it was unable to determine whether
the measure at issue, the EU Seal Regime, falls within the scope of
the TBT, and therefore reversed all of the panel's findings under
TBT Articles 2.1, 2.2, 5.1.2, and 5.2.1.169 Consequently, the
Appellate Body did not address the specifics of the panel's
reasoning under TBT Article 2.1.
The Appellate Body did, however, address the panel's analysis
of GATT Articles 111:4. After upholding the panel's finding of a
violation under GATT Articles 1:1, 7 the Appellate Body turned to
Article III:4, specifically the issue of whether "the legal standard
under ... 111:4 entails an inquiry into whether the detrimental
impact of a measure on competitive opportunities for like imported
products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
163 See id. $$ 5.27-.29.
164 TBT, supra note 3, art. 2, Annex 1:1.
165 Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 5.59.
166 Id. T$ 5.27-29.
167 Id. 1j 5.35, 5.54-.57.
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distinction.""' The EU argued in favor of incorporating the
concept of a "legitimate regulatory distinction" into Article 111:4
because of the clause "treatment no less favorable," which also
appears in TBT Article 2. 1.172 The Appellate Body, in the few
recent decisions that have analyzed TBT Article 2.1, has
consistently interpreted "treatment no less favorable" in TBT
Article 2.1 to permit differential treatment, i.e. a detrimental
impact on competitive opportunities for like imported products, so
long as the difference in treatment stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction.173
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding
that, in spite of the identical terminology in GATT Article 111:4
and TBT Article 2.1, it was not appropriate to read into the former
the latter's exception for a detrimental impact, which is based on a
legitimate regulatory distinction.174 The mere fact that the two
provisions impose "similar [legal] obligations" does not mean that
they "must be given identical meanings."' The Appellate Body
affirmed that the phrase "treatment no less favorable" in TBT
Article 2.1 must be read in the context of the sixth recital of the
preamble to the TBT Agreement, which recognizes the right of
Member countries to take necessary regulatory measures.'17  In
contrast, the balance between a Member's right to regulate and
171 Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 5.97. The EU did not
challenge the panel's ultimate finding that the measure at issue violates GATT Article
III:4 because it has a detrimental impact on competitive conditions for like imported
products from Canada and Norway, rather, it only challenged the panel's interpretation
of the phrase "treatment no less favorable" in Article 111:4. Id. 1 5.130, n.1071.
172 See supra note 161 (comparing TBT Article 2.1 with GATT Article 111:4).
173 See Appellate Body Report, US.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4, T 169, 174,
182, 194 ("[A] panel must further analyze whether the detrimental impact on imports
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than reflecting
discrimination against the group of imported products."); see also Appellate Body
Report, US.-Tuna II, supra note 4, 1 215 ("[A] panel should... seek to ascertain
whether the technical regulation at issue modifies the conditions of competition in the
relevant market to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-a-vis the group of
like domestic products or like products originating in any other country."); Appellate
Body Report, US.-COOL, supra note 4, T 271 ("[W]here a regulatory distinction is not
designed and applied in an even-handed manner[,]... that distinction cannot be
considered 'legitimate' .... ).
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obligation not to discriminate in the GATT is satisfied by a
separate general exceptions clause in Article XX." Consequently,
there is no need to read an exception for legitimate regulatory
distinctions into GATT Article 111:4.118 A contextual interpretation
based on the differences in the two provisions thus trumps a
strictly textual interpretation, which would treat identical
phraseology consistently.17 9
The emphasis on differences in context versus identical text
can also be seen in the Appellate Body's analysis of the chapeau to
GATT Article XX.'80 The Appellate Body first upheld the panel's
finding that the EU Seal Regime is "necessary to protect public
morals" within the meaning of GATT Article XX(a).'8 ' The
Appellate Body affirmed the panel's analysis under GATT Article
XX(a), finding that the panel properly considered "both the
prohibitive and permissive aspects of the EU Seal Regime" in
"weighing and balancing" the importance of the objective, the
"trade-restrictiveness" of the measure, the contribution of the
measure to the goal of "protecting public morals," and "less-
restrictive alternatives." 82
The Appellate Body then turned to the issue of the chapeau to
GATT Article XX. After a very thorough review of prior
Appellate Body decisions interpreting the chapeau,'" the
Appellate Body flatly rejected the panel's approach of applying
the same legal test to the Article XX chapeau as it applied under
TBT Article 2.1.184 The panel, in choosing to replicate its analysis
under TBT Article 2.1, cited the Appellate Body's prior
observations regarding the relationship between the GATT and the
TBT and the absence of a general exceptions clause in the latter,
effectively equating the test for a legitimate regulatory distinction
with the chapeau.'" The panel was clearly cognizant of this when
enunciating the legal standard under TBT Article 2.1: the
177 Id. 5.125.
178 See id. f 5.125-.126.
179 See id. 5.129.
Iso See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 5.299-.300.
18 Id. 15.179
182 Id. %f 2.82, 5.215, 5.217, 5.289.
183 See id. 5.296-306.
184 Id. 5.313.
1i Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.649.
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Appellate Body incorporated language from the sixth recital of the
preamble to the TBT, "subject to the requirement that [the
measures] are not applied in a manner that would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised
restriction on international trade . .. .. 6 Identical language
appears in the chapeau to GATT Article XX.*
In rejecting the panel's application of its reasoning under TBT
Article 2.1 to the GATT Article XX chapeau, the Appellate Body
noted the significant differences between the two provisions,
including the different legal standards applicable as well as the
relative function and scope of the two provisions.' With respect
to the applicable legal standards, the Appellate Body noted that the
standard applicable to TBT Article 2.1 is whether the detrimental
impact on imported products stems exclusively from a "legitimate
regulatory distinction" rather than reflects discrimination against
imported products, whereas the standard under the chapeau is
whether a measure is "applied in a manner that would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail."' In making this
contrast, the Appellate Body seems to ignore the genesis of the
legal standard of "legitimate regulatory distinction" that it created
in the antecedent TBT decisions,' namely the sixth recital of the
TBT preamble, which explicitly references "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination."' 9 ' In fact, by incorporating the sixth
recital of the preamble into TBT Article 2.1, the Appellate Body
created significant textual similarities between Article 2.1 and the
chapeau. 192  This would seem to support consistent
186 TBT, supra note 3, pmbl.
187 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX, chapeau ("Subject to the requirement that
such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade .... ).
188 Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, % 5.311-.312.
189 Id. 5.311; GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX, chapeau.
190 See supra note 173 (discussing the Appellate Body's approach with respect to
the "legitimate regulatory distinction" standard in U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, US.-Tuna II,
and U.S.-COOL).
191 See TBT, supra note 3, pmbl.
192 See id.; GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX, chapeau.
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interpretation.193
Nevertheless, with respect to the function and scope of the two
provisions, the Appellate Body noted another important
distinction, namely that "it is only the regulatory distinction that
[causes] the detrimental impact .. . on imported products" which
"is to be examined to determine whether it is .. . legitimate" under
TBT Article 2.1.1 In contrast, under the chapeau, a measure
could be found to be "applied in a manner that constitutes an
arbitrary or unjustifiable [means of] discrimination" based on
some ground other than the discrimination found to be inconsistent
with the non-discrimination requirements under GATT Articles I
and 111.195. This point implicates the context of the phrase
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" in the chapeau,'" and
demonstrates why a strictly textual analysis of the two provisions,
whereby the interpretation and application of the former governs
the latter, is inappropriate.'97
Having rejected the panel's findings under the chapeau, the
Appellate Body undertook an independent analysis of whether the
EU Seal Regime constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination."198 The Appellate Body concluded that the
measure was applied in an "arbitrary or unjustifiable manner," in
part because "the European Union made [efforts] to facilitate the
access of Greenlandic Inuit to the IC exception," but failed to
make comparable efforts to facilitate the access of Canadian
Inuit. .. ."'9 Consequently, the measure violated GATT Articles
1:1 and III:4 and could not be justified under Article XX(a).2 00
193 See supra text accompanying notes 188-192 (discussing how interpretation used
to be varied but is becoming more consistent because of the Appellate Body's recent
decisions).
194 Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4,1 5.312.
195 Id.; GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX, chapeau; see GATT 1947, supra note 2,
art. I, III.
196 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX, chapeau.
197 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 5.312
(discussing key differences between TBT Article 2.1 and the chapeau of GATT XX with
respect to scope and function).
198 See id. 115.316-.339.
199 Id. 5.338.
200 See id. T 5.339.
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IV: Implications of the Appellate Body Decision in EC-Seal
Products
The Appellate Body decision in EC-Seal Products is notable
primarily for its emphasis on context and its approach to national
treatment, both under the TBT and the GATT.2 01 This decision
confirms that the legal standards applied to an allegedly
discriminatory measure under TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Article
III:4 differ, potentially rendering the former irrelevant.20 2 The
decision also confirms the near impossibility of satisfying the test
for justifying a discriminatory measure under the chapeau to
GATT Article XX.203 Notably missing from the Appellate Body
decision is any reference to the issue of discriminatory intent,
which factored heavily into the panel's analysis, thereby
confirming the Appellate Body's insistence that regulatory intent
is irrelevant under GATT Article XX. 204
A. The TBT National Treatment Obligation Is Less Strict
Than That of the GATT
In EC-Seal Products, the Appellate Body confirmed its
interpretation of TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Article 111:4 as
imposing different levels of a non-discrimination obligation.20 5
Historically, the TBT and the GATT were interpreted as applying
different levels of scrutiny relating to national treatment.20 6 Prior
to U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, GATT Article 111:4 was considered to be
the less strict provision because of the availability of the
201 See id. 5.1-.339; see also Robert S. Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie Sykes,
Sealing the Deal: The WTO's Appellate Body Report in EC - Seal Products, 18 ASIL
INSIGHTS, Iss. 12 (June 4, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/
18/issue/12/sealing-deal-wto%E2%80%99s-appellate-body-report-ec-%E2%80%93-
seal-products (discussing national treatment under the Appellate Body's decision in EC-
Seal Products).
202 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 5.313; see also
Howse et al., supra note 201 (discussing the narrowed scope of the TBT under the
Appellate Body's analysis in EC-Seal Products).
203 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, IT 5.316-.339.
204 See id.; see also Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 8.2 (explaining
that the objective of the EU Regime factored into their findings).
205 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 5.339.
206 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4.
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exceptions in GATT Article XX which may justify a
discriminatory measure. 207 Since U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, once the
sixth recital of the TBT preamble was incorporated, TBT Article
2.1 has been characterized as the less strict provision because it
permits discriminatory treatment if there is a "legitimate regulatory
distinction" and even-handedness in application, while GATT
Article 111:4 prohibits all discriminatory treatment.208
Additionally, discriminatory measures under GATT Article 111:4
must satisfy the complex, multi-layered test of GATT Article XX,
both with respect to the sub-paragraph invoked and the chapeau.20 9
Consequently, it was thought to be easier to justify a
discriminatory regulatory measure under the legitimate regulatory
distinction and even-handedness requirements of TBT Article 2.1
than under GATT Articles 111:4 and XX.2 10
The Appellate Body decision in EC-Seal Products cements the
status of TBT Article 2.1 as the less burdensome provision,
thereby potentially rendering it superfluous.2 1 1 It is unlikely there
would ever be a situation where TBT Article 2.1 applies to a
measure but GATT Article 111:4 does not, because GATT Article
111:4 has broader scope than TBT Article 2.1.212 Given that a
measure is less likely to withstand scrutiny under the combination
of GATT Articles 111:4 and XX than under TBT Article 2.1 alone,
in order to give effect to the latter provision, it would be necessary
to delineate the scope of the two agreements in a disjunctive
manner. There is a conflict provision in the general interpretative
note to Annex lA of the Marrakesh Agreement:
In the event of conflict between a provision of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another
agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (referred to in the agreements in
Annex lA as the "WTO Agreement"), the provision of the other
207 See ZLEPTNIG, supra note 45, at 105.
208 See Kim, supra note 7, at 10,838-40; see also CONRAD, supra note 46, at 163.
209 VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 51, at 552.
210 Kim, supra note 7, at 10,838-40.
211 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 12.125.
212 See GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. III:4; see also TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note
27, at 138 (noting that GATT Article 111:4 applies to all internal laws, regulations, and
requirements other than internal taxation measures). In contrast, TBT Article 2.1 applies
specifically to technical regulations and standards. See TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note
27, at 309; see also TBT, supra note 3, art. 2.1.
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agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.2 13
However, there are differing interpretations of the application
of the conflict rule in a situation where both the GATT and the
TBT apply, but a measure is found to violate the GATT but not the
TBT. Some scholars believe that in such cases the conflict rule
provides that the TBT governs and no violation should be found;
others believe this does not implicate the conflict rule and that the
GATT violation governs.2 14  The conflict rule has never been
interpreted, and given the uncertainty over how it should be
interpreted, an amendment of the texts would be necessary to
clarify that a finding of non-violation of the TBT supersedes a
finding of violation of the GATT in cases where both apply,
thereby preserving the protections of the TBT for technical
regulations and standards.2 15
B. It Is Nearly Impossible to Satisfy the Chapeau Test of
213 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization General
interpretive note to Annex IA, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
214 Compare Joost Pauwelyn, Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT
Phantoms Still Haunt the WTO, 15 EJIL 575, 588 (2004) (asserting that once a measure
is justified under the TBT Agreement, such justification trumps any violation of the more
general GATT), with WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ENFORCING WORLD TRADE RULES: ESSAYS ON
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND GATT OBLIGATIONS 330-31 (2006) ("The last
possibility is a measure that violates Article III (and is not excused by Article XX) but is
permitted under TBT Article 2.2 .... If the true conflict rule were applied, and a
violation of GATT but not of the TBT Agreement were found, there would be no
conflict, so the GATT violation would stand notwithstanding the absence of a TBT
violation. If a broader view of conflict were taken, then it might be argued that a conflict
exists and that under the WTO Agreement's conflict rule, the TBT Agreement prevails
over the GATT, which would mean no violation would be found. For me, it would not
be appropriate to find a conflict in this situation.").
215 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. X: 1,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (requiring acceptance by two-thirds of all Members
for an amendent to enter into force and for it to only come into force for those Members
who accept the amendment). Only one amendment has been successfully proposed to
any of the WTO Agreements, TRIPS Article 3 Ibis, and even this amendment is not yet
in effect because it has not been adopted by the requisite two-thirds of Members to be
included in TRIPS. The WTO Members officially accepted the amendment in 2005, but
a 2007 ratification deadline and subsequent extended deadlines in 2009 and 2011 all
passed without the two-thirds threshold having been met. Brin Anderson, Better Access
to Medicines: Why Countries are Getting "Tripped" Up and Not Ratifying Article 31-
bis, I CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH & INTERNET 165, 167-68 (2010). To date, 53 Members
have accepted the Amendment, which means that an additional 53 Members must ratify
the Amendment before it will take effect. Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
amendment_e.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2014).
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GATTArticle XX
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the Appellate
Body decision in EC-Seal Products is that it is extremely unlikely
a measure will ever satisfy the chapeau test of GATT Article
XX. 2 16  The hurdles of Article XX, particularly the chapeau to
Article XX, have proven fatal in nearly every case in which the
provision has been invoked.217  The multitudinous interpretations
of what exactly is required by the chapeau, including
interpretations that would require Members to take affirmative
action to ameliorate discriminatory effect in order to be compliant
with the chapeau, explain why it is so difficult to satisfy.218
The Appellate Body has consistently held that the focus of the
chapeau is on the manner in which a measure is being applied
rather than the general design of the measure, which is covered by
the individual subparagraphs of Article XX.219 An analysis under
the chapeau should not duplicate the analysis conducted with
respect to either the subparagraphs of GATT Article XX or the
substantive obligations of the GATT.22 0 There are three
component aspects of the chapeau: arbitrary discrimination,
unjustifiable discrimination, and disguised restriction on trade.22 1
In U.S.-Gasoline, the Appellate Body read these three concepts as
216 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 5.3.3.
217 See Only One of 40 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV
"General Exception" Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the WTO Exception Construct
Will Not Provide for an Effective TPP General Exception, PUB. CITIZEN (May 2014),
https://www.citizen.org/documents/general-exception.pdf (noting that GATT Article XX
exceptions have been invoked in 40 WTO disputes, and that in 39 of them, the defense
was unsuccessful). The only exception is EC-Asbestos, where the panel's finding that
the measure fell within the exception in GATT Article XX(b) was vacated on appeal
because the Appellate Body held that the measure did not violate GATT Article 111:4 and
consequently did not need to reach the GATT Article XX issue. See Dispute Settlement
Summary, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products
Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/
cases e/ds135 e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) ("Report(s) adopted, no further action
required on 5 April 2001.").
218 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX.
219 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, 1 339 (Apr. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter US.-Gambling]; see also Appellate Body Report, US.-Gasoline, supra note
47, at 21-22; ZLEPTNIG, supra note 45, at 116, 275.
220 ZLEPTNIG, supra note 45, at 278-79.
221 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX.
661
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
interrelated and overlapping,222 but other decisions, and some
scholars, treat them independently. 223 For example, "unjustifiable
discrimination" exists, according to the Appellate Body in U.S.-
Shrimp, where a measure constitutes a country-wide import ban if
product-specific import prohibitions would have been sufficient to
satisfy the policy goal at stake,224 or where a Member unilaterally
imposes an environmental protection measure without undertaking
serious efforts at bilateral or multilateral negotiation.22 5 On the
other hand, discrimination is "arbitrary" where requirements of
due process are not met or where a measure "imposes a single,
rigid[,] unbending requirement" on exporting countries "without
inquiring into the appropriateness of that [requirement] for
conditions prevailing in the exporting countries. "226 The chapeau
therefore focuses on procedural aspects of regulatory cooperation
and due process.2 27
Examples of application of the chapeau test to the facts of a
dispute illustrate why the test is so difficult to satisfy.2 28
According to the Appellate Body in Brazil-Tyres, the test for
whether a discriminatory aspect of a measure is arbitrary or
unjustifiable under the chapeau is whether the rationale or cause of
the discrimination rationally relates to the interest sought to be
protected.2 29 in Brazil-Tyres, the Appellate Body held that a
measure banning the importation of retreaded tires was
provisionally justified under GATT Article XX(b) as necessary for
the protection of public health and the environment. 23 0 However,
the application of the measure was arbitrary and unjustifiable in
violation of the chapeau because the measure included a carve-out
for tires from MERCOSUR countries necessitated by a
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal ruling, thereby discriminating
222 Appellate Body Report, US.-Gasoline, supra note 47, at 22.
223 See ZLEPTNIG, supra note 45, at 278-91.
224 See Appellate Body Report, US.-Shrimp, supra note 34, 1 164; ZLEPTNIG, supra
note 45, at 280.
225 Appellate Body Report, US. -Shrimp, supra note 34, 166-67.
226 Id. 1 178-83; see also ZLEPTNIG, supra note 45, at 287-88.
227 Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court's Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 676, 719
(2009).
228 See generally Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres, supra note 121; Appellate
Body Report, US.-Gasoline, supra note 47.
229 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres, supra note 121, 1 232.
230 See id. 11 225, 238.
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against non-MERCOSUR countries, and this discrimination bore
no rational connection to the asserted interest of protecting public
health and the environment.231
In contrast, in U.S.-Gasoline the Appellate Body held that
discrimination between domestic and foreign gasoline producers in
a gasoline emissions regulation was unjustifiable because the
measure gave domestic refiners time to restructure their operations
without applying the same considerations to foreign companies,23 2
and the United States failed to seek the cooperation of foreign
producers and governments prior to enacting the measure.233 The
lack of cooperative efforts or efforts to ameliorate discriminatory
effect by the United States consigned the measure to fail the
chapeau test.234 Similar concerns were apparent in the Appellate
Body decision in EC-Seal Products.23 5 The Appellate Body noted
that the EU made efforts to facilitate access to the IC exception by
Greenlandic Inuit but failed to make comparable efforts with
respect to Canadian Inuit.236 The Appellate Body also found that
the application of the EU Seal Regime did not allow for an inquiry
into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for conditions
prevailing in an exporting country.2 37
The reality that the chapeau test is unlikely to ever be satisfied
in practice upsets the delicate balance between GATT Article 111:4
and Article XX.23 8 The Appellate Body refused to incorporate an
exception in GATT Article III:4 for differential treatment that
results in a "detrimental impact [on] competitive opportunities for
like imported products [but] stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction" because of the availability of the general
exceptions in Article XX.239 The GATT Article XX exceptions
"serve the [important] function of distinguishing between
legitimate regulatory choices and excuses for protectionism,"
where protectionist governments should not be permitted to use a
231 See id. T 232.
232 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 47, at 28.
233 Id. at 25.
234 Id. at 29.
235 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 5.337.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. 111:4, XX.
239 Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, T 5.125.
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"legitimate objective as an excuse to design [a] domestic polic[y
that] inhibit[s] foreign competition."2 40 However, if Article XX
cannot serve its function of protecting regulatory autonomy due to
the impossibility of meeting the chapeau test, the result is a strong
non-discrimination obligation with no room for regulatory
flexibility. 241 This is clearly inconsistent with the object and
purpose of Article XX, to allow "members to adopt trade-
restrictive ... measures that pursue legitimate societal values or
interests .... "242
C. The Appellate Body Has a Conflicted Relationship with
the Issue ofIntent
There is a strong presumption in WTO law that regulatory
intent does not matter in determining whether or not a measure is
WTO-consistent, including intent as demonstrated in legislative
history.243 The Appellate Body's refusal to consider legislative
history as evidence of intent derives from a desire to avoid
considering subjective evidence. 2" However, some argue that the
intent of a regulatory body in enacting a measure is relevant to
whether that measure is consistent with a Member's WTO
obligations when attempting to justify a measure under the general
exceptions in GATT Article XX.2 45 A comparison of the panel and
Appellate Body reasoning in EC-Seal Products illustrates why
intent is a deeply conflicted issue.2 46
Under the panel's approach to the GATT Article XX chapeau
in.EC-Seal Products, discriminatory intent is highly relevant and
is ascertained primarily by analyzing legislative history.247 In
240 Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory
Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 153, 154 (2008).
241 Id. at 164.
242 VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 51, at 617.
243 See, e.g., Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Still Hazy after All These Years:
The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax
Discrimination, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 36, 58; see also VAN DEN BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra
note 51, at 683 ("[Tlhe intent of the persons engaging in 'dumping' is irrelevant in the
determination of whether dumping exists.").
244 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4, 219-26.
245 MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 480.
246 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4; Panel Report, EC-
Seal Products, supra note 4.
247 See Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4.
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crafting its three-part test for "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination," the panel in EC-Seal Products placed a great deal
of emphasis on the "even-handedness" of design or application of
the EU Seal Regime. 24 8 This is a requirement above and beyond
the requirement previously enunciated by the Appellate Body in
Brazil-Tyres that, to satisfy the prohibition of "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" under the chapeau, the rationale for
discrimination in a regulatory measure must be related to the
interest sought to be protected under a subparagraph of Article
XX. 249 Whether a measure is "designed" to be discriminatory is
essentially another way of asking whether the legislature or
regulatory body enacting a measure intended it to be
discriminatory.25 0 According to the panel, even if the
discrimination relates to the interest sought to be protected, as was
the case with the IC exception, if regulators knew and intended the
discrimination to happen, the measure lacks even-handedness and
violates the chapeau. 251' The aspect of a regulatory measure with
one or more exceptions that is therefore most likely to draw
scrutiny is the measure's legislative history, from which evidence
of the legislature or regulator's intent can be inferred.25 2
In EC-Seal Products, the most damning evidence that the
panel pointed to in concluding that the IC and MRM exceptions
discriminated against foreign products while benefiting domestic
products was legislative history.253 Specifically, the panel referred
numerous times to studies commissioned by the European
Commission's Directorate-General for the Environment, which
were conducted by consultants, COWI (referred to as the COWI
Reports).254 The panel relied on evidence from the 2010 COWI
248 See id. $ 7.650.
249 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres, supra note 121, $ 232.
250 See Panel Report, EC Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 7.650.
251 Id.
252 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Tuna II, supra note 4, 1 314; see also
Appellate Body Report, U.S-COOL, supra note 4, $ 371; see also McGrady, supra note
240, at 156 ("[T]he Appellate Body has previously held that a regulatory goal should be
determined objectively and that a [M[ember's characterization of its goal as evidenced
by texts of statutes, legislative history, pronouncements of government agencies and
officials may be taken into account.").
253 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, $$ 7.315, 7.351.
254 European Commission, Directorate-General Environment, Assessment of the
Potential Impact of a Ban of Products Derived from Seal Species (Apr. 2008); European
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Report to conclude that the IC exception lacked even-handedness
in application because it was crafted to apply only to seal products
from Greenland and not to seal products from Canada.255 The
2010 COWI Report specifically stated that "only Greenland will
be able to make the investments needed to make use of [IC]
exemptions," and that "the scale of the Canadian .. . hunt is too
small and not as centrally organized as that in Greenland ....
Similarly, with respect to the MRM exception, the panel found
evidence in the 2010 COWI Report that the MRM exception was
not applied even-handedly because it was designed to apply to seal
products from EU countries, including "Sweden, Finland, and
possibly the United Kingdom," but not seal products from Canada
and Norway. 25 7 This is a glaring example of the type of evidence
generated during the legislative or regulatory process that will be
fatal to a measure as demonstrating discriminatory intent in design
and both the TBT and the GATT.258 Whether legislative or
regulatory bodies have the capacity or wherewithal to avoid
generating this type of evidence, which explicitly discusses
preferential treatment for domestic products and the exclusion of
foreign products, is questionable: but this is one simple way to
protect regulatory measures and make it less likely that they will
be found WTO-inconsistent.2 59
The Appellate Body squarely rejected the panel's chapeau
analysis in EC-Seal Products, and, in doing so, confirmed the
Appellate Body's avowed refusal to consider intent when
determining if a measure's application is protectionist.26 For
example, GATT Article III provides that internal taxes and other
internal regulations should not be applied "so as to afford
protection to domestic production."2 1  The Appellate Body in
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II stated that the issue under
Commission, Directorate-General Environment, Study on knplementing Measures for
Trade in Seal Products: Final Report (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 COWI Report].
255 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 11 7.315, 7.650.
256 2010 COWI Report, supra note 254.
257 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.323, 7.351, 7.650 (citing
2010 COWI Report Annex 4).
258 Id.
259 Id. 17.654.
260 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, § 6.
261 GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. III, 11.
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GATT Article 111:2, "whether 'directly competitive or
substitutable' imported and domestic products [are] 'not similarly
taxed"' so as to afford protection to the domestic products, is not
an issue of intent.26 2 The Appellate Body specifically stated, "[i]t
is not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons
legislators and regulators . .. have for what they do," or to "weigh
the relative significance of those reasons to establish . .. regulatory
intent."2 63 Rather, the real issue is how the measure is applied,
which can be discerned from an examination of "the design, the
architecture, and the revealing structure of [the] measure."2
A similar formulation, looking to "the design, architecture,
revealing structure, operation," and application of a measure, was
incorporated into the TBT Article 2.1 analysis of detrimental
impact and discrimination by the Appellate Body in US.-Clove
Cigarettes.265 The Appellate Body did not reference the guidance
from Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, namely that
legislative intent is not relevant to this inquiry, nor did the
Appellate Body engage in any analysis of legislative history in
determining whether the U.S. measure discriminated against
imported cigarettes.266 Instead, the Appellate Body based its
positive determination of discrimination on the design of the U.S.
measure banning clove-flavored cigarettes, which are virtually all
imported from Indonesia, but exempting menthol-flavored
cigarettes, which are virtually all produced domestically. 267 The
Appellate Body also noted that clove-flavored cigarettes were
effectively the only type of flavored cigarettes the ban affected.2 68
It could be argued that the Appellate Body's insistence that
legislative intent is irrelevant when analyzing the design of a
measure is an exercise of self-delusion, because it is impossible to
consider how a measure was designed without considering
legislative history.269 However, in disputes where the Appellate
262 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 27,
WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 28-29.
265 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 4, 1 182.
266 See id. T$ 219-26.
267 See id. T 220-24.
268 Id. 224.
269 See GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. III, $ 3.
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Body has gone through the steps of considering the "design,
architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application" of a
measure, the Appellate Body has rigorously sought to avoid
subjective evidence such as legislative history.270
While the EC-Seal Products panel's reliance on legislative
history is contrary to Appellate Body guidance, arguably, it goes
directly to what the GATT and the TBT are supposed to address,
namely protectionism.27 ' According to Matsushita, Schoenbraum,
and Mavroidis, non-discrimination is simply legalese for non-
protectionism.272 There are two ways to find protectionism: either
by looking at trade-effects or looking for evidence of protectionist
intent.273 Punishing trade-effects is sub-optimal because trade-
effects that discriminate may be completely accidental.27 4 The
better approach would be to punish where there is evidence of
discriminatory intent, though discriminatory intent is generally
difficult to detect.2 75 Under the GATT, this problem is resolved by
asking if there is evidence of adverse effects under Article 111:4,
then putting the burden on the responding Member to demonstrate
a lack of intent under GATT Article XX, because the responding
party is presumed to be better informed and capable of justifying
its policy as non-protectionist. 2 76  Accordingly, under GATT
Article XX, necessity is used as a proxy for intent.277
The panel's methodology in EC-Seal Products can be viewed
270 See, e.g., id. 11 219-26.
271 See Moonhawk Kim, Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the GATT/WTO,
64 WORLD POL. 426, 433-37 (2012) (discussing the link between a state's protectionist
motivations and other state's hostile reactions).
272 MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 479.
273 Id. at 479-80; see also Jacqueline Peel, Confusing Product with Process: A
Critique of the Application of Product-Based Tests to Environmental Process Standards
in the WTO, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 238 (2002); Bret Puls, The Murky Waters of
International Environmental Jurisprudence: A Critique of Recent WTO Holdings in the
Shrimp/Turtle Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 343, 379 (1999).
274 MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 480.
275 Id. But see Sean T. Fox, Note, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for
Unilateral Trade Measures to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499, 2541
(1996) (arguing for the converse in that panels should examine "where the burden of the
trade measure falls rather than second-guessing the motives of the national legislators"
because "panels rarely have either the capacity or the political legitimacy to question the
intentions of national leaders").
276 See MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 480.
277 Id.
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as incorporating a necessity test into the chapeau. 278  This is
essentially the approach advocated by scholars such as Gaetan
Verhoosel, who argues for collapsing the Article III and Article
XX inquiries into a single examination of whether distinctions
applied to non-competing products can be justified as necessary or
rational in light of a legitimate non-protectionist public purpose.279
According to Verhoosel, the distinction between the analysis of
discrimination under GATT Article III and under Article XX is,
with respect to the latter, whether the discrimination is arbitrary or
unjustifiable, a test that can be equated with the necessity test.28 0
Discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable when it could be
avoided, for example, where it is not necessary.28' To support this
theory, Verhoosel points to the Appellate Body's analysis in U.S.-
Gasoline, where the Appellate Body stated that the United States'
omission to explore means of mitigating the effects of its measure
or to take into account the costs imposed on foreign refiners went
well beyond what was necessary for the panel to find a violation of
GATT Article 111:4.282 Verhoosel points out that this is but one
example of the Appellate Body at first distinguishing the analysis
under the chapeau as a unique inquiry independent from that under
GATT Article III, but still nonetheless borrowing from its analysis
under GATT Article III to support its chapeau findings.2 83
The panel's analysis of the chapeau in EC-Seal Products can
be viewed as consistent with the approach advocated by
Verhoosel.284 After finding that the IC exception fell within the
scope of GATT Article XX(a) and met its relational clause, the
panel nonetheless found that the discrimination between
commercial/foreign seal products and non-commercial/domestic
seal products was arbitrary or unjustifiable because the EU Seal
278 See Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 7.644.
279 TREBILCOCK, ET AL., supra note 27, at 169-70. See generally VERHOOSEL, supra
note 14, at 65 (arguing that "for a proper line to be drawn between trade liberalization
and deep integration or negative harmonization, WTO adjudicators should apply an
integrated necessity test under the provisions of the GATT and the GATS laying down
their respective National Treatment obligations").
280 VERHOOSEL, supra note 14, at 65.
281 Id. at 66.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 67.
284 See supra notes 278-283 and accompanying text. See generally Panel Report,
EC-Seal Products, supra note 4.
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Regime had been designed to permit only certain domestic
products into the EU market.28 5 The panel termed this intended or
designed discrimination a "lack of even-handedness."8
Intentional discrimination is arbitrary and unjustifiable because it
is not just foreseeable, but also avoidable and unnecessary.28 7
Verhoosel's approach admittedly loses some of the distinction
between the inquiry under the sub-paragraph of GATT Article XX
and the chapeau.2 88 However, in some cases the Appellate Body
has blurred the line between these two steps of analysis under
Article XX.289 For example, in U.S.-Gasoline, the Appellate
Body, in interpreting the chapeau, noted that the United States had
more than one alternative measure whose use may have avoided
any discrimination, thereby incorporating the least restrictive test
from the Article XX sub-paragraphs into the chapeau.290
Therefore, while the EC-Seal Products panel's analysis of the
chapeau conflicts with the letter of Article XX jurisprudence, 291 it
is not entirely out of line with prior Appellate Body practice.2 92
D. Discriminatory Intent Can Be Addressed in the GATT
Article XX Sub-Paragraphs
It should be noted that the Appellate Body has been presented
with opportunities to interpret the chapeau to GATT Article XX to
include an even-handedness requirement but has not done so,
suggesting the Appellate Body does not view "even-handedness"
as a requirement under the chapeau.2 93 However, the Appellate
285 See Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 1 7.650.
286 Id.
287 See Addendum to Panel Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of
Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, at B-34, 1 14, WT/DS431/R/Add.1,
WT/DS432/R/Add.1, WT/DS433/R/Add.l (Mar. 26, 2014).
288 VERHOOSEL, supra note 14, at 67.
289 See Jeffrey Waincymer, Reformulated Gasoline Under Reformulated WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora out ofa Chapeau?, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L.
141, 174 (1996).
290 Id.
291 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
292 See Waincymer, supra note 289, at 174.
293 The Appellate Body was presented with an opportunity to read a requirement of
"even-handedness" into the chapeau in Korea-Beef, where Korea argued that the
chapeau to GATT Article XX required that national legislation be applied "even-
handedly" between trading partners. Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef supra note 41,
24. However, the Appellate Body found that Korea's measure was not justified under
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Body in U.S.-Gasoline and U.S.-Shrimp did explicitly read a
requirement of "even-handedness" into sub-paragraph (g) of
GATT Article XX. 29 4  Accordingly, it would seem that the
discriminatory intent evidenced in the design of the EU Seal
Regime could have been adequately addressed under sub-
paragraph (a) of GATT Article XX rather than the chapeau.29 5
There are two elements to the sub-paragraphs of GATT Article
XX: a measure must fall within the range of policies protected by a
specific sub-paragraph, and it must satisfy the relational clause,
which in the case of Article XX(a) is "necessary to." 29 6
Protectionist intent could be addressed through either of these
elements.2 97
A measure falls within the scope of a sub-paragraph where the
policy objective or regulatory goal of the measure falls within the
ambit of that sub-paragraph. 2 98  "[T]he Appellate Body has.. .
held that [while the] regulatory goal [of a measure] should be
determined objectively. . . , a [M]ember's characterization of its
goal, as evidenced by texts of statutes, legislative history,
pronouncements of government agencies and officials, may be
taken into account."2 " The panel in EC-Seal Products could have
determined, considering the clear evidence of discriminatory intent
in the legislative history, that the EU Seal Regime did not fall
within the scope of GATT Article XX(a), because its regulatory
purpose was not to protect the morals of the EU public."*
The discriminatory intent behind the EU Seal Regime could
alternatively have been addressed by the second element of GATT
Article XX(a), the relational clause "necessary to.""o' Determining
Article XX(d) and did not reach the question of whether the measure satisfied the
requirements of the chapeau. Id. 185.
294 Appellate Body Report, U.S-Gasoline, supra note 47, at 20-21; Appellate Body
Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 34, 1 143; see also Panel Report, China-Measures
Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 7.459-.466, WT/DS394/R,
WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011).
295 See generally McGrady, supra note 240 (addressing the application of the
"necessity tests" in GATT art. XX(a),(b) and (d)).
296 Id. at 155.
297 See id. at 154.
298 See id. at 155-57.
299 Id. at 156; Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gambling, supra note 219,1304.
300 See GATT 1994, supra note 2, art. XX(a) ("necessary to protect public morals").
301 See id.
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whether a measure is "necessary" requires a weighing and
balancing of several factors, including "the importance of the
interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution to the
achievement of the measure's objective, and its trade
restrictiveness."302 The aspect of a measure, which must be
"necessary" for the attainment of an interest or policy objective, is
not the measure as a whole, but rather the GATT-inconsistent
aspects of the measure.303 The Appellate Body reaffirmed this
principle in Thailand-Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes
from the Philippines, stating that the showing of "necessity" under
Article XX(d) is a showing not that a measure as a whole is
necessary, but that a discriminatory regulatory distinction is
necessary.3  The panel in EC-Seal Products found that the EU
Seal Regime as a whole did materially contribute to the EU
.objective of protecting morals in the EU by reducing global
demand for seal products,3" but did not consider whether the
302 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres, supra note 121, 1 178 ("If this analysis
yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, this result must be
confirmed by comparing the measure with its possible alternatives . . . ."). The necessary
test "can be characterized as a test of relative necessity, which compare[s the] GATT
inconsistency of the adopted measure[] with reasonably available alternatives" and
weighs and balances these alternatives, considering the "contribution made by the ...
measure . . . , the importance of the .. . interests or values [to be] protected... , and
the .. . impact" of the measure on trade. CONRAD, supra note 46, at 287-88.
303 Aaditya Mattoo & Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade, Environment and the WTO: The
Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article XX of GAIT, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 327, 338 (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann ed., 1997).
304 Appellate Body Report, Thailand-Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes
from the Philippines, 1 177, WTIDS37I/AB/R (June 17, 2011); Benn McGrady &
Alexandra Jones, Tobacco Control and Beyond: The Broader Implications of United
States - Clove Cigarettesfor Non-Communicable Diseases, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 265, 272
(2013). There is some conflicting jurisprudence on this issue, as the Appellate Body in
U.S.-Gasoline criticized the panel for asking whether the "less favorable treatment" of
imported gasoline was "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural resources, rather
than asking whether the "measure" was "primarily aimed at" conservation of clean air,
suggesting that there is a fine line between analyzing whether the discriminatory aspect
of a measure is necessary, which is permissible, and analyzing whether discrimination
under GATT Article III:4 is necessary, which is not permissible. Appellate Body Report,
US.-Gasoline, supra note 47, at 16. For a general discussion of necessity tests, see Note
by the Secretariat, "Necessity Tests" in the WTO, S/WPDR/W/27 (Dec. 2, 2003). The
analysis under the sub-paragraphs of GATT Article XX is not supposed to merely
duplicate.the analysis under the substantive obligations of the GATT. Id. T 50.
305 Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, % 7.638-.639.
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discriminatory regulatory distinctions, the IC and MRM
exceptions, were necessary or materially contributed to that
interest.o' If the panel had correctly applied the "necessary"
test, 30 it would likely have concluded that the IC and MRM
exceptions did not materially contribute to the policy objective of
protecting EU public morals because the exceptions were designed
primarily to protect domestic seal hunting industries.30 s Therefore,
discriminatory intent motivating a measure can be addressed either
as part of the scope determination or the relational clause of a
GATT Article XX subparagraph.
V: Implication for Regulators
The implication for regulators and national legislatures from
the panel and Appellate Body decisions in EC-Seal Products is
that measures are most likely to be found inconsistent with the
GATT and the TBT if they include exceptions or carve-outs
favoring domestic products or services.3 0 ' Given the lack of an
exception in GATT Article III:4 for differential treatment based on
a legitimate regulatory distinction and the difficulty of justifying a
measure under GATT Article XX, any carve-out resulting in
differential treatment for a domestic product will likely be WTO-
inconsistent.o Unfortunately for regulators, it is likely that these
types of carve-outs are included in regulatory measures because
they are necessary to appease a domestic constituency."'
Domestic constituencies may also prevent regulatory bodies from
enacting regulations necessary to come into compliance with
international obligations.3 12 This is particularly relevant in the
306 See generally id.
307 See supra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.
308 See Panel Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, 17.300.
309 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Seal Products, supra note 4, T 5.320.
310 See supra notes 45-50, describing the limitation on exceptions to GATT art.
III:4.
311 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their
Limits, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 115, 126-28 (2009); Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling
Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to
Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 30-31 (2002).
312 See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 97-102 (2013)
("Persuasion of domestic constituencies is a necessary condition for a state's compliance
with persuasion treaties.").
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environmental context.' 3 From the perspective of a regulator, it is
likely not feasible to eliminate all exceptions from regulatory
measures in order to ensure that they are consistent with WTO
obligations.314 Consequently, there is tension between enacting
regulatory measures that include carve-outs to satisfy domestic
constituencies, making the measures WTO-inconsistent, and not
enacting regulatory measures at all."'
However, the key takeaway from WTO jurisprudence on
regulatory measures to date is that in balancing the political reality
of needing to satisfy domestic constituents with the possibility of
being in violation of international obligations under the WTO
agreements, the GATT and the TBT, most governments will
choose to satisfy a domestic constituency."' This is due to several
factors that weigh against the theoretical gravity of violating WTO
obligations.' First, there is no guarantee a regulatory measure
will be challenged at the WTO because WTO disputes are very
318
expensive. Unless a measure adversely impacts a WTO
Member in a critical industry,3 19 that Member may be unwilling to
313 See generally id. (explaining how domestic politics have plagued the enactment
of environmental regulations required by international agreements). "Environmental
treaties serve as a leading example of persuasion treaties, though persuasion treaties are
not limited to the environmental arena." Id. at 64 n.4. In the United States, national
leaders have failed "to conclude effective [environmental] treaties, and the treaties [they]
do conclude fail to garner compliance." Id. at 65. Thus, "[t]here is a pressing need for a
new approach to treaty problems." Id.
314 See Verdier, supra note 311, at 126-30.
315 Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death of Domestic Political
Constituencies, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 207-08 (1999).
316 See Durkee, supra note 312, at 88-89 ("[S]tate interests are the products of
domestic political processes and interactions between individuals and groups.").
317 See Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance
with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POt'Y INT'L Bus. 555, 563-64 (2002)
(arguing that Members "maintain the overall balance of benefits and burdens
contemplated in the covered agreements").
318 See Victor Mosoti, Africa in the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 427, 428-29 (2006) (estimating the cost of a dispute that gets appealed to
the Appellate Body to be $500,000).
319 See Andrea E. Goldstein & Steven M. McGuire, The Political Economy of
Strategic Trade Policy and the Brazil-Canada Export Subsidies Saga, 27 WORLD ECON.
541, 548 (2004). See generally MARC L. BUSCH, TRADE WARRIORS, STATES, FIRMS, AND
STRATEGIC-TRADE POLICY IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION (Cambridge Univ. Press,
1999) (arguing that states will "maximize their national welfare gains," and in doing so,
they "weigh the expected. benefits from intervention against the potential costs of
initiating a trade war").
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bring a dispute it is not guaranteed to win.3 20  Second, even if a
measure is challenged, the respondent can delay resolution of the
dispute for a significant period of time,"' possibly until the
domestic situation resolves itself or the need to satisfy the
domestic constituency is no longer an issue.322
Finally, even when a measure is challenged and found to be
inconsistent with a WTO obligation, WTO Members have
historically had a relatively poor track record at coming into
compliance, 32 3 where compliance is defined as the revocation of an
inconsistent measure. 324 There are several reasons for this. It may
be possible for the violating Member to make very minor changes
to a regulation to come within the letter of a panel or Appellate
Body decision. 3 25  Alternatively, in some cases, WTO Members
320 See PETER HOLMES ET AL., TRADE, DEV. RESEARCH GRP., EMERGING TRENDS IN
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: BACK TO THE GATT? 21 (2003) (noting that the "high
proportion of complainant victories" in disputes suggests "complainants consider very
carefully the likelihood of success before bringing" a dispute).
321 William J. Davey, Expediting the Panel Process in WTO Dispute Settlement, in
THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 409, 415-20
(Merit E. Janow et al. eds., 2008). For example, one estimate of the average length of a
WTO dispute is up to two and a half years. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C.
Mavroidis, WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance, 23 WORLD ECON.
527, 531 (2000).
322 See generally HOLMES ET AL., supra note 320.
323 See Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the World Trade
Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve
Compliance from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 147 (2001);
Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement
in GA TT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 167-68 (2000).
324 Frieder Roessler, The Scope of WTO Law Enforced Through WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedures, in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT &
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 331, 331-32 (Merit E. Janow et al. eds., 2008). There is some
debate in WTO law as to whether or not compliance should be defined solely as
revocation of an inconsistent measure. MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 118 ("A
problem with the implementation of WTO dispute settlement recommendations and
rulings is the lack of guidance over exactly what a losing party must do to comply.").
However, DSU Article 22.8 suggests that compliance should be defined as removal of an
inconsistent measure, and that alternatives such as compensation or retaliation are only
temporary solutions. DSU, supra note 33, art. 22.8 ("The suspension of concessions or
other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the
Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the
nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.").
325 MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 118 ("The tendency has been for the
losing party to take minimal steps and declare itself in full compliance."); see also
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have chosen to pay compensation,32 6 which is typically calculated
as a lump sum, 327 and then never revoke the inconsistent
measure.32 8  In some of the most contentious cases where a
Member was faced with a strong and vocal domestic constituency
opposing elimination of a WTO-inconsistent measure, the Member
has chosen to continue implementing the measure and faced
retaliation in the form of suspension of concessions. 32 9 Retaliation
is generally calculated to impact sensitive domestic constituencies
of the losing Member, 30 but the fact that Members still refuse to
JACQUELINE D. KRIKORIAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND DOMESTIC POLICY:
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WTO 81-82 (2012) (pointing out that the U.S.
government "thwarted the potential impact of the dispute settlement mechanism .. . by
implementing them in such a way as to minimize their overall effect").
326 See Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, 8.1, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9,
1999); MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 119 ("Compensation is voluntary and the
subject of agreement between the parties to the dispute.").
327 See Award of the Arbitrators, United States - Sec. 110(5) of the US. Copyright
Act (Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU), 1 4.73, WTIDSl60/ARB25/1
(Nov. 1, 2001); see also SHERZOD SHADIKHODJAEv, RETALIATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 23 (2009) (noting the monetary compensation that arose out of a
WTO case where, after negotiations, the U.S. government agreed to a temporary
arrangement that required a lump-sum payment of USD 3.3 million).
328 SHADIKHODJAEv, supra note 327, at 23-24 (2009) (explaining how the U.S.
government never revoked, and has yet to be asked to revoke, their inconsistent measure
after agreeing to pay compensation over a three year period, at the end of which, the
parties were supposed to re-enter consultations if the measure hadn't been removed).
329 MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 119-20. Retaliation is authorized under
DSU Article 22.2, which provides that if the losing party fails to bring its offending
measure into compliance within 20 days from the expiry of the reasonable period allotted
under DSU Article 21.3, the winning party may request authorization from the DSB to
retaliate by suspending trade concessions. DSU, supra note 33, art 22.2. Retaliation can
be in "the same economic sector in which the nullification or impairment has been
found," in a different sector under the same agreement, or in a sector under a different
agreement. MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 12, at 120. Retaliation is supposed to be
temporary and "terminated once the inconsistent measure has been removed, the losing
party has provided a solution to the nullification [and] impairment of benefits, or the
parties have reached a satisfactory solution." Id.
330 Request for Authorization of Suspension of Concessions or Other Obligations by
Ecuador, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/52 (Nov. 9, 1999) (requesting permission to suspend concessions
under agreements other than GATT). Ecuador requested permission to suspend
concession because the economic cost of withdrawal of concessions in goods alone
would have had a greater impact on Ecuador than the EC. Id. Instead Ecuador requested
permission to suspend concessions under TRIPS, including in the areas of copyright of
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come into compliance by revoking the inconsistent measure tends
to show that the original domestic constituency is stronger or more
motivated than any harmed by the retaliation."'
VI: Conclusion
The EC-Seal Products dispute is notable for several reasons.
The panel ostensibly followed the path laid out by the Appellate
Body in the recent trio of TBT decisions, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes,
U.S.-Tuna II, and US.-COOL, of using GATT Article XX
jurisprudence to analyze TBT Article 2.1, for example, by
incorporating the terms "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"
into the determination of whether a regulatory distinction is
legitimate. 3 2 However, the panel's innovative transposition of the
analysis under TBT Article 2.1 to GATT Article XX, grounded in
textual similarities between the two provisions, was soundly
rejected by the Appellate Body, based on a contextual
interpretation of differences between the two provisions.3 In
applying a similar contextual analysis to GATT Article III:4 and
TBT Article 2.1, the Appellate Body clarified the relationship
between the two provisions and, by rejecting a limitation for
legitimate regulatory distinctions in the former, confirmed the
status of GATT Article III:4 as the stronger national treatment
obligation.334
The Appellate Body also cemented the status of the GATT
Article XX chapeau test as one that is practically impossible to
sound recordings, geographical indications, and patents. MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note
12, at 170. In EC-Hormones, the United States was granted authorization to retaliate by
suspending concessions up to $116.8 million per year, and chose to do so by targeting,
among other products, Italian scarves and Roquefort cheese. Joost Pauwelyn, The
Calculation and Design of Trade Sanctions in Context: What is the Goal of Suspending
WTO Concessions?, § 3 (2008) (Working Paper presented at the Interdisciplinary
Workshop on the Calculation and Design of Trade Sanctions in WTO Dispute
Settlement, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration), available at
http://graduateinstitute.ch/lang/en/pid/7308.
331 Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules
- Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AMER. J. INT'L L. 335, 343-44 (2000)
(demonstrating that countermeasures are ineffective at inducing compliance except
where imposed by a Member disproportionately stronger than the target).
332 See supra Sec. 111.2.
333 See supra Sec. 111.3.
334 See supra Sec. IV. 1.
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satisfy."' In doing so, the Appellate Body steadfastly refused to
consider evidence of regulatory or legislative intent, such as
legislative history.336 This refusal by the Appellate Body is
somewhat disingenuous, as the preferred test laid out by the
Appellate Body, looking to the "design, architecture, revealing
structure, operation, and application" of a measure, necessarily
implicates regulatory intent.' However, protectionist intent can
and should be addressed in the sub-paragraphs of GATT Article
XX, rather than under the chapeau as the panel did in EC-Seal
Products."'
The lesson for regulators following EC-Seal Products is that
exceptions in regulatory measures are likely to be fatal when tested
against GATT Articles 111:4 and XX.33 9  However, given the
factors that make it unlikely that a regulatory measure will be
challenged at the WTO and Members' poor track record at coming
into full compliance in the event of an adverse WTO ruling, WTO
obligations will likely not prevent regulators from including
discriminatory exceptions in regulatory measures when necessary
to satisfy domestic constituencies.3 40
335 See supra Sec. IV.2.
336 See supra Sec. IV.3.
337 Id.
338 See supra Sec. IV.4.
339 See supra Sec. V.
340 Id.
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